

## Message Text

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ACTION PM-07

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 IO-15 ISO-00 CIAE-00 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-15

USIA-15 ACDA-19 NEA-10 TRSE-00 MBFR-04 SAJ-01 OIC-04

AEC-11 OMB-01 DRC-01 /163 W  
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R 261530Z SEP 73

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7648

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

USMISSION GENEVA

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

USNMR SHAPE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BONN 13927

GENEVA FOR CSCE DEL; SHAPE FOR INTAF

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, GW

SUBJECT: MBFR: CONVERSATION WITH FRG CHIEF NEGOTIATOR  
BEHREND

REF: (A) BONN 13501, (B) BONN 13738

BEGIN SUMMARY: DURING SEPT 25 CONVERSATION WITH EMBOFF  
PRIOR TO UPCOMING TRIP TO WASHINGTON (REF A), AMBASSADOR  
BEHREND COMMENTED ON THE COMMON CEILING ISSUE AND  
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BUNDESWEHR FORCE STRUCTURE PROPOSALS, CONSTRAINTS,

CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES (CBM'S) AND THE RELATED ISSUES OF AREA AND VERIFICATION, AS WELL AS BOTH U.S. AND SOVIET PURPOSES IN THE MBFR ENTERPRISE. BEHREND'S SAID HE WOULD BE GOING TO WASHINGTON MAINLY TO LISTEN AND LEARN AND TO GET REACQUAINTED WITH KEY AMERICAN MBFR OFFICIALS, BUT ALSO WOULD WISH TO EXPLAIN FRG VIEWS ON SOME OF THE ABOVE TOPICS. END SUMMARY

1. REDUCTIONS AND COMMON CEILING. BEHREND'S SAID HE WOULD BE EMPHASIZING THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT'S POSITION THAT AGREEMENT TO A COMMON CEILING OBJECTIVE WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT GOAL OF MBFR-I NEGOTIATIONS. HE SAID THIS OPINION WAS SHARED BY BOTH FOREIGN MINISTER SCHEEL AND DEFENSE MINISTER LEBER AND HAD THE PERSONAL ENDORSEMENT OF CHANCELLOR BRANDT. THE DIVERGENCE OF VIEW BETWEEN SCHEEL AND LEBER, WHICH WAS EVIDENT AT THE RECENT GERMAN FEDERAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING (BONN 13080-LIMDIS), WAS A MATTER OF TACTICS. BEHREND'S SAID THIS TACTICAL MATTER WOULD BE CONSIDERED AGAIN BY THE FEDERAL SECURITY COUNCIL FOLLOWING THIS WEEK'S SCHEEL-KISSINGER BILATERAL IN NEW YORK. IN ANY EVENT, BEHREND'S SAID HE SHARED THE U.S. JUDGMENT REPORTEDLY VOICED LAST WEEK IN WASHINGTON TO VISITING DEFENSE MINISTRY OFFICIAL STEINHAUS THAT THE COMMON CEILING APPROACH WAS LIKELY TO SERVE WESTERN INTEREST EVEN IF IT WAS REGISTERED BY THE SOVIET UNION. WHILE THE U.S. AND ALL FRG OFFICIALS INTEND TO PRESS FOR SOVIET AGREEMENT TO THE COMMON CEILING, RUSSIAN REJECTION OF SUCH A PARITY TYPE CONCEPT COULD, IN BEHREND'S VIEW, ALSO BE USED WITH WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION IN ARGUING FOR MAINTAINING ALLIED DEFENSE EFFORTS. BEHREND'S SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE CDU/CSU GERMAN OPPOSITION PARTY ALSO WAS INCLINED TO SUPPORT THE COMMON CEILING APPROACH BUT, LIKE THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT, WAS INSISTING ON A CLOSE LINKAGE BETWEEN THE TWO MBFR PHASES AND REDUCTIONS OF INDIGENOUS AS WELL AS STATIONED FORCES.

2. BUNDESWEHR FORCE STRUCTURE REFORM. BEHREND'S SAID DEFENSE MINISTER LEBER PRESENTLY IS WORKING WITHIN THE SPD BUNDESTAG CAUCUS TO OBTAIN AGREEMENT FOR A

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REORGANIZED BUNDESWEHR FORCE STRUCTURE THAT WOULD ASSURE FORCE LEVELS AND DEFENSE EXPENDITURES FOR THE NEXT 10 TO 15 YEARS. OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE IN LEBER'S VIEW IS THE NEED TO ASSURE ACCEPTABLE EXPENDITURE LEVELS FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT. BEHREND'S, WHO WAS FOR 9 YEARS CHIEF OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY NATO DEPT, NOTED THAT THE BUNDESWEHR WAS ESTABLISHED NEARLY 20 YEARS AGO AND THAT

A VERY LARGE PERCENTAGE OF BUNDESWEHR VEHICLES AS WELL AS OTHER EQUIPMENT ARE NOW IN NEED OF REPLACEMENT. CONSEQUENTLY, BEHRENDT SAID LEBER IS WITHIN THE SPD BUNDESTAG CAUCUS SEEKING AGREEMENT, NOT WITHSTANDING MBFR, TO THE MAINTENANCE FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE OF PRESENT DEFENSE EXPENDITURE LEVELS AS AUGMENTED BY THE ANNUAL RATE OF INFLATION. IN THIS CONNECTION, DEFENSE MINISTRY POLICY PLANNING CHIEF WIECK IS PRESSING FOR A FORCE STRUCTURE REORGANIZATION WHICH WOULD, INTER ALIA, INVOLVE THE CONVERSION OF SOME 30,000 BUNDESWEHR ARMY FORCES TO "NON UNIFORMED-READY (PERHAPS 24 HOURS) RESERVE STATUS." WHILE THE

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NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-15

USIA-15 ACDA-19 NEA-10 TRSE-00 MBFR-04 SAJ-01 OIC-04

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R 261530Z SEP 73

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7649

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

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FORCE STRUCTURE PLAN IS UNLIKELY TO BE IN FINAL SHAPE BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR, BEHREND'S NOTED THAT THE ROUGHLY 30,000 MAN FIGURE WOULD CORRESPOND TO ALMOST 10 PERCENT OF GERMAN GROUND FORCES, OR AS HE PUT IT, JUST ABOUT RIGHT FOR MBFR-II BUNDESWEHR REDUCTIONS. HOWEVER, WHILE WIECK STILL IS APPARENTLY PUSHING HARD FOR THIS APPROACH, BEHREND'S EXPRESSED SERIOUS DOUBT THAT THE USSR WOULD ACCEPT SUCH A READY RESERVE STRUCTURE FOR BUNDESWEHR FORCE REDUCTION IN THE MBFR CONTEXT.

3. CONSTRAINTS. BEHREND'S CONFIRMED OUR REFTEL B  
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REPORT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE GERMANS ARE TAKING A MUCH MORE CAUTIOUS--HE ADDED THE WORD COOL--APPROACH TO MBFR CONSTRAINTS OUT OF CONCERN FOR LIKELY SOVIET COUNTER DEMANDS THAT COULD BURDEN PROSPECTS FOR EUROPEAN UNION AND THE INTEGRITY OF WESTERN DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS. ON THE OTHER HAND, BEHREND'S ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE FRG WAS TAKING A SOMEWHAT MORE AMBITIOUS APPROACH TOWARD CBM'S IN THE CSCE FRAMEWORK. WHEN EMBOFF SOUGHT RATIONALE FOR THIS MIXED APPROACH, BEHREND'S POINTED TO OBLIGATORY NATURE OF MBFR CONSTRAINTS, WHICH OF NECESSITY ACCOMPANY AND MAKE PLAUSIBLE REDUCTIONS, AND WHOSE VIOLATION BY THE SOVIETS WOULD POSE SERIOUS SUBSTANTIVE QUESTIONS TO ALLIED GOVERNMENTS. ON THE CONTRARY, CBM'S WERE WHOLLY VOLUNTARY IN CHARACTER AND THE QUESTION OF A VIOLATION OF A SOLEMN COMMITMENT WOULD THEREFORE NOT BE ENTAILED IN THE AGREEMENT OF A GOVERNMENT--FOR EXAMPLE--TO ACCORD PRE-NOTIFICATION OF AN EXERCISE, ETC. GIVEN GERMAN AND OTHER EC-9 MEMBER STATE CONCERNS, PARTICULARLY OVER THE QUESTION OF THE CONSTRAINTS AREA, THE GERMANS PRESENTLY WERE INCLINED TO PRESS HARDER FOR A CSCE/CBM ON LARGE MILITARY MOVEMENTS AND TO ADOPT A MORE CIRCUMSPECT VIEW TOWARD SOME MBFR CONSTRAINTS. ON THE AREA QUESTION, BEHREND'S EXPRESSED THE PERSONAL VIEW THAT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO PRESS THE SOVIETS INITIALLY ON CONSTRAINTS TOUCHING THE WESTERN MILITARY DISTRICTS, ONLY TO FALL BACK LATER WITH A SOFTENED POSITION FOR TRADE-OFF PURPOSES.

4. VERIFICATION. BEHREND'S SAID HE SHARED THE U.S. VIEW THAT THE SOVIETS ARE HIGHLY UNLIKELY TO ACCEPT ANY TYPE OF ON-SITE INSPECTION WITHIN WMD'S. HE CONFIRMED THE ESSENTIAL GERMAN APPROACH TO VERIFICATION PROBLEMS REPORTED REFTEL, BUT SAID SOME TYPE OF INSPECTION BY

CHALLENGE VIA MOBILE MILITIA UNITS COULD BE TO THE  
ADVANTAGE OF THE WEST MORE THAN TO SOVIET INTERESTS  
IF SUCH UNITS HAD FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND WERE NOT  
CIRCUMSCRIBED BY THE SOVIETS. BEHREND'S SAID HE  
THOUGHT SOME TYPE OF INSPECTION WOULD BE OBJECTIVELY  
USEFUL TO VERIFYING THE CARRYING OUT OF SOME MBFR  
CONSTRAINTS, WHICH HE SAID COULD NOT BE FULLY VERIFIED  
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VIA NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. AGAIN HOWEVER, BEHREND'S  
THOUGHT IT UNLIKELY THAT MOSCOW WOULD ACCEPT VERIFICA-  
TION BEYOND NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, BUT THOUGHT  
THERE MIGHT BE SOME TRADE-OFF VALUE IN MAKING THESE  
DEMANDS.

5. NON-CIRCUMVENTION. BEHREND'S SAID HE THOUGHT THE  
NON-CIRCUMVENTION TOPIC SHOULD BE HANDLED WITH GREAT  
CARE. IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL TO HAVE A VERY PRECISE NON-  
CIRCUMVENTION PROVISION LIMITED TO SOVIET FORCES IN

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R 261530Z SEP 73

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7650

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY ROME  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS  
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HUNGARY. BUT BEHREND'S EMPHASIZED THAT IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL TO AVOID ANY GENERALIZED OR FUZZY NON-CIRCUMVENTION CLAUSE THAT COULD AFFORD MOSCOW A PRETEXT FOR OBJECTING, FOR EXAMPLE, TO MAJOR NEW GERMAN EXPENDITURES FOR BUNDESWEHR.

6. U.S. MOTIVATION. BEHREND'S SAID HE HOPED TO GAIN SOME APPRECIATION IN WASHINGTON FOR AMERICAN POLITICAL OBJECTIVES IN MBFR AND THE TIME FRAME U.S. OFFICIALS THOUGHT THEY HAD TO WORK WITH IN MBFR-I NEGOTIATIONS. HE ADDED THE PERSONAL VIEW, BASED ON HIS LONG FOREIGN OFFICE NATO DEPT EXPERIENCE, THAT CONGRESSIONAL VIEWS  
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TEND TO SHIFT WITH TIME AND SHOULD NOT BE THE MAJOR DETERMINATE OF WESTERN MBFR POLICY. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE SAID HE FULLY AGREED WITH THE RECENT BUNDESTAG ARGUMENTATION OF CDU/CSU BUNDESTAG LEADER CARSTENS, WHO HAD COME DOWN STRONGLY AGAINST NEGOTIATING UNDER TIME PRESSURE IN MBFR.

7. EASTERN MOTIVATION. BEHREND'S SAID RUMANIAN EMBASSY COUNSELLOR IN BONN HAD TOLD HIM RECENTLY THAT WARSAW PACT HAD NOT ENGAGED IN SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF EASTERN MBFR NEGOTIATION POSITION; (THIS CORRESPONDS TO COMMENTS MADE TO EMBOFF LAST WEEK BY LOCAL YUGOSLAVIAN DIPLOMAT--SEE BONN 13469). BEHREND'S SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE ECONOMIC FACTORS WERE CENTRAL TO RUSSIAN MBFR POLICY. HE SAID SOVIET DIPLOMAT HAD TOLD HIM ONCE THAT GDR HAD A KIND OF PAYMENTS ARRANGEMENT COVERING SOVIET FORCES STATIONED IN EAST GERMANY AND THAT SUCH RED ARMY FORCES CONSEQUENTLY COST NO MORE TO STATION IN THE GDR THAN IN THE SOVIET UNION. BEHREND'S SAID HE HAD GAINED THE IMPRESSION THAT MOSCOW HAD BEEN SEEKING A TYPE OF BURDEN SHARING ARRANGEMENT WITH OTHER EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AS WELL. BEHREND'S NOTED THE COMMENT DURING VIENNA MIT OF HUNGARIAN DEL REP TO THE EFFECT

THAT SOVIET REDUCTIONS IN HUNGARY WOULD BE A MIXED  
BLESSING AS THEY WOULD REQUIRE A CORRESPONDING  
INCREASE IN HUNGARIAN DEFENSE EFFORTS.  
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## Message Attributes

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**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
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**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** morefirh  
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**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
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**TAGS:** PARM, GE  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005